I. INTRODUCTION
Judges make law. It is not the only thing judges do. They also run courtrooms, hire clerks and attend meetings. But amidst these other sorts of activities, judges also make law. We have known this at least since the legal realists of the early 20th Century. With the growth, and then dominance, of legal realism over the course of the last century, it is now a truism that judges make law. 1 Yet many judges and lawyers are still reluctant to acknowledge publicly the inevitability of judicial lawmaking. In fact, judges and lawyers sometimes publish statements that tend to conceal from the public the fact that judges make law-for example, statements describing the judicial role in a way that omits the lawmaking part of this role. These omissions are especially common in debates over the Missouri Plan, a method of judicial selection that divides the power to appoint judges between the governor and the bar. The Missouri Plan is one of three widely-used methods of selecting state court judges. 3 The other two are: (1) direct election of judges by the citizenry, and (2) appointment of judges by democratically elected officials, typically the governor and/or legislature, with little or no role for the bar. Each of these two methods of judicial selection respects a democratic society's basic equality among citizens-the principle of one-person, one-vote. Judicial elections directly vindicate this principle and appointment of judges indirectly vindicates it if the appointment is by officials who themselves were elected under the principle of one-person, one-vote. 4 In contrast, the Missouri Plan violates this 1 . See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 2. Several variants of the Missouri Plan are in use but they have the following in common: When a vacancy on the bench occurs, a nominating commission assesses applicants and narrows the pool of applicants from which the governor may select, typically to three; the governor then must pick one of those three and that person is thereby appointed to the court without any further process, such as a confirmation vote in the legislature; crucially, some members of the commission are selected by the bar. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (describing the process in greater detail). Unfortunately, prominent bar groups use the term "merit selection" rather than "Missouri Plan" to describe all judicial appointment systems with a nominating commission of any sort, regardless of who selects the commission or whether the commission's power is checked by a confirmation vote in the legislature. Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 760-61 (2009) . "This term, 'merit selection,' is 'propagandistic' and obscures important distinctions among appointive systems. Accordingly, I suggest that people reject the term 'merit selection' in favor of the more-neutral 'Missouri Plan' and that people reserve the term 'Missouri Plan' for [judicial selection systems] that lack confirmation by the senate or similar popularly elected body." Id. at 761-62 (internal citations omitted).
3. See id. at 752-64 (describing the various methods used). 4. See id. at 754-55 ("In those states in which the governor may appoint to the court whomever he or she wants, subject only to confirmation by a popularly elected body such as the state senate, judicial selection is laudably democratic because governors and state senators are elected under the principle of one-person-one-vote. In these elections, members of the bar get no principle by making a lawyer's vote worth more than another citizen's vote. 5 The Missouri Plan's central problem is that it is undemocratic. This problem's importance, however, is apparent only to those who realize that judges are lawmakers. We all realize that governors and legislators are lawmakers so each of the fifty United States selects governors and legislatures democratically, in direct elections. We also generally use a form of democracy-the indirect democracy of appointment by governors and legislatures-to select the leaders of the various government departments, boards and commissions that administer a modern state because we understand that these officials also make law. In contrast, we do not select our doctors, plumbers and hairdressers democratically because we understand that these jobs do not entail making law.
In general, lawmakers in our society are selected democratically and nonlawmakers are not selected democratically. However, judges selected by the Missouri Plan are incongruous; they are lawmakers but they are not selected democratically. They are not selected in accord with the basic democratic principle of one-person, one-vote.
Quite simply, the Missouri Plan is an aberrant violation of our society's practice of selecting lawmakers democratically. This undemocratic aberration empowers lawyers at the expense of non-lawyers so it is disappointing, but perhaps not surprising, that lawyers are prominent among those who defend the Missouri Plan. Unfortunately, their defense sometimes includes statements that may mislead the public into believing that judges do not make law. Rather than candidly educating the public about the judicial role, some lawyers arguing for a judicial selection system that especially empowers them make arguments based on a mythical view of judging that was refuted nearly a century ago by the legal realists.
The first section of this article briefly outlines the standard, "balanced realist" view that judging inevitably involves lawmaking. In doing so, it explains how widely accepted this view is, even among originalists, such as Justice Scalia, Randy Barnett and Steven Calabresi. Section II documents efforts by lawyers and judges in one state, Kansas, to defend their (especially special powers.").
5. See supra note 2. To say that the Missouri Plan violates the principle of one-person-onevote is not to say that the Missouri Plan therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court's Equal Protection case law does not require all government officials to be selected in accord with one-person-one-vote, see, e.g., Nelson Lund, May Lawyers Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who Choose Our Judges? "Merit Selection" and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1043 , 1050 -60 (2011 , and three federal circuit courts have held that various versions of the Missouri Plan fall within these exceptions. See Dool v. Burke, No. 10-3320, 2012 WL 4017118 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2012 ) (Kansas), Carlson v. Wiggins, 675 F.3d 1134 , 1140 -42 (8th Cir. 2012 ) (Iowa), Kirk v. Carpenti, 623 F.3d 889, 890 (9th Cir.2010 ) (Alaska). For a contrary view, see Dool v. Burke, No. 10-3320, 2012 WL 4017118 (10th Cir. Sept. 13, 2012 who contend that judges should interpret the U.S. Constitution's text as it was originally understood, rather than according to evolving social norms. For example, an organization that has done much to advance the cause of originalism, the Federalist Society, says "that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be."
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Under this view, roughly stated, if evolving social norms warrant constitutional change then those changes should be enacted through amendments to the constitution's text, 12 rather than through the process of non-originalist judicial interpretation, which practically invites "activist" judges to convert their own policy preferences (political views) into law.
Yet even Justice Scalia, perhaps the leading originalist, "has repeatedly stated that judges 'make the law,' resolving policy issues in the process." 13 Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 777-78 (2011) (quoting Rush Limbaugh's praise for originalism); Justin Driver, Ignoble Specificities, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 5, 2012, at 35 ("originalism has, in a shockingly short period of time, dramatically altered the terms of public constitutional discourse").
11. About Us, Our Background, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/ab outus/page/our-background (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) . See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.").
12. See, e.g., Renee Lettow Lerner, Enlightenment Economics and the Framing of the U.S. Constitution, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL 'Y 37, 45 (2012) ("If the enumerated powers set out in the Constitution are thought to be too restrictive, the proper solution is to amend the Constitution, not to distort certain provisions beyond recognition. Although amendments to the Constitution have become very rare, in earlier times--when judges and other officials and citizens took the language of the Constitution more seriously--amendments were more frequent.").
13. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 710 (2009) LAW 6, 9, 12 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ). See also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (Scalia, J.) ("Not only do state-court judges possess the power to 'make' common law, but they have the immense power to shape the States' constitutions as well. Which is precisely why the election of state judges became popular." (internal citation omitted)); James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. Of course this mode of action poses 'difficulties of a ... practical sort,' when courts decide to overrule prior precedent. But those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to 'make new law,' and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches." (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 10 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("It is only in this [20th] century, with the rise of legal realism, that we came to acknowledge that judges in fact 'make' the common law, and that each state has its own.").
That judges make law does not much trouble Justice Scalia and other "great worriers over judicial usurpation" because they "typically draw a sharp distinction between constitutional judicial review and the common law process."
14 In other words, activist judges injecting their policy preferences into constitutional law is deeply troubling to originalists, but activist judges injecting their policy preferences into the common law is not.
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This distinction follows from the premise that law should be made democratically. Democratic worries about judicial activism are far more severe when judges invoke a constitution to nullify statutes 16 than when judges make common law, which can be overturned by statute. POLITICS, 16-18 (2d ed. 1986) ). The opposite problem-judges declining to hold a statute unconstitutional because the statute embodies the judge's policy preferences-raises somewhat different concerns.
17. It is routine to treat the "common law" and "judge-made law" as equivalents. See Lueck v. Superior Court In & For Cochise Cnty., 469 P.2d 68, 70 (Ariz. 1970) , superseded by statute on other grounds, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-612(C) ("When we find that the common law or 'judge-made law' is unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to change it."); Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, (1983) ("When it is determined that the common law or judge-made law is unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to change it." (citing City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 503 P.2d 803, 805 (Ariz. 1972) ); Aluli v. Trusdell, 508 P.2d 1217 , 1221 (Haw. 1973 ) (stating that "common law or judge-made law is the functional equivalent of statutory law"); Woodman v. Kera LLC, 785 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Mich. 2010) ("Given that the common law develops through judicial decisions, it has been described as 'judge-made law. '" (citing Placek v. Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1979) ); Werner v. Hartfelder, 342 N.W.2d 520, 521 (Mich. 1984 ) ("the Court has recognized . . . that the common law is judge-made law . . . .").
18. See, e.g., Marie K. Pesando, 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 3 (2012) ("The common law migrated to this continent with the first English colonists, who claimed the system as their birthright; it continued in full force in the 13 original colonies until the American Revolution, at which time it was adopted by each of the states as well as the national government of the new nation. As new states were formed, they too adopted, by express provision or force of judicial decision, the principles of the common law insofar as applicable to their conditions." (internal citations omitted)); William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 5 (noting that "the English common law was the seminal influence on the formative generation of American lawyers."); NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 352-380 (1997) (explaining how the United States appropriated English common law as the basis of the its legal system); DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 35-42 (1965) common law by enacting statutes.
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And the ultimate trump card, the Constitution, is made by the highest lawmaking authority in a democratic society, the People themselves. Therefore, it is entirely consistent to want judges continuing to make the common law evolve to incorporate what the current generation of judges believes to be good policy, while forbidding judges from interpreting statutes and constitutions in that judge-emboldening way.
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In short, originalism's concerns about judicial activism focus on (describing English common law as the foundation of America's legal system). For examples of reception statutes, see, e.g., Virginia General Convention Ordinance of May 6, 1776, ch. 5, § 6, 1776 Va. Colony Laws 33, 37 ("And be it further ordained, that the common law of England, all statutes and acts of Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first [1607] , and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, together with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony now in force, so far as the same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations and resolutions of the General Convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony."); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2000) ("The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, which are local to that kingdom and not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force for the time being, are the rule of action and decision in this state, any custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding").
19. See, e.g., Marie K. Pesando, 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 10 (2012) ("The English common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states of the Union with the exception of Louisiana, where the civil law prevails in civil matters. The common law prevails generally throughout the United States, except as modified, changed, or repealed by statute or constitutional provisions of an individual state"); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 116 (1998) LAW 3, 12 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (praising the common law method: "It has proven to be a good method of developing the law in many fieldsand perhaps the very best method."); . at 38 (defending "original meaning" constitutional interpretation against "The Living Constitution").
The ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the existence of what is called The Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society. And it is the judges who determine those needs and "find" that changing law. Seems familiar, doesn't it? Yes, it is the common law returned, but infinitely more powerful than what the old common law ever pretended to be, for now it trumps even the statutes of democratic legislatures. Id. at 38. KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y [Vol. XXII:2 constitutional and statutory cases and are no obstacle to acknowledging that judges inevitably make the common law.
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The acknowledgment that judges inevitably make the common law became routine with the growth, and then dominance, of legal realism, over the course of the last century.
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While the Legal Realists had many, and sometimes divergent, views, their "most basic insight" is "that common-law judges make public policy in deciding cases no less than legislators do in enacting laws."
23 Like most everyone else, Justice Scalia says that it was with 21. Of course, originalists-like others-engage in a variety of different debates about how judges should make the common law. One of these debates is the pace at which the common law should evolve. Perhaps originalist judges tend to be conservative and perhaps conservative judges generally have a Burkean or Hayekian respect for longstanding common law as embodying the accumulated wisdom gained from many generations of trial-and-error experience. See, e.g., Todd J. Zywicki & Anthony B. Sanders, Posner, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 559, 582 (2008) ("Hayek shares the traditional view that cases are merely illustrations of more abstract legal principles; cases are not 'law' in and of themselves. The independent efforts of many judges deciding many cases over time generates legal principles, and it is those principles that matter, not the constituent cases themselves. The legal principles that emerge from this implicit collaboration among many judges reflect greater wisdom and consensus than any individual judge deciding any individual case. Thus, it is that Hayek characterizes the common law as a spontaneous order in the same way that the market is a spontaneous order.") Perhaps such judges tend to subordinate their own policy preferences to the policies already embodied in the common law and thus hew closely to precedents, resulting in a common law that evolves slowly and cautiously. In contrast, progressive judges may tend to see longstanding common law less positively and thus be more willing to replace it with new law reflecting the policy preferences of current judges, resulting in a common law that evolves more rapidly.
22. "In the early part of the twentieth century, the hard-headed and clear-eyed Justice Holmes, the leader of the legal realists, insisted that it was a myth that judges decided controversial cases by 'finding' rather than making the law. That contention was a step in the direction of a more mature and honest legal system." Lino A. Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953 (1967) ("Ambiguity, properly defined, is an entirely distinct concept from that of vagueness. A word that may or may not be applicable to marginal objects is vague. But a word may also have two entirely different connotations so that it may be applied to an object and be at the same time both clearly compel a single result in each case that might arise, as reasonable people can disagree about the best interpretation of the statute and, therefore, the best result of the particular case. "The legal realists saw the interpretation of statutory ambiguities as necessarily involving judgments of policy and principle. They insisted that when courts understand statutes to mean one thing rather than another, they use judgments of their own, at least in genuinely hard cases." 28 This realist view that statutory interpretation often involves "substantial judicial discretion" and therefore constitutes "judicial lawmaking, not lawfinding," had by the 1950s, "become deeply rooted."
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These realist points about judicial lawmaking in statutory interpretation apply as well to judicial lawmaking in constitutional interpretation. That constitutional provisions are sometimes vague or ambiguous is acknowledged by just about everyone, including prominent originalists like Randy Barnett, who explains as follows.
[O]riginalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that identifies the meaning of the text as its public meaning at the time of its enactment. 
B. Balanced Realism and the Multifaceted Role of a Judge
To recap, it is a "truism that judges make law." 40 That "we are all realists now" is so thoroughly accepted as to be a cliche.
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Of course, this does not mean that each branch of governmentlegislative, executive and judicial-plays an equally large role in making law (as distinguished from applying and enforcing law). As noted above, the common law is an important realm for judicial lawmaking, but whatever law judges make in this realm can be overturned by the other two branches, through enactment of a statute. And even when the other branches leave an area of lawmaking to the judiciary, the common law process tends to minimize the extent to which any individual judge's policy preferences become law. The common law evolves one case at a time and following precedent is the norm, so major changes in the common law tend to require sustained consensus of many judges across time. '[w] e are all legal realists now,' it is too late in the day to pretend that when judges adjudicate disputes between adversaries, both of whom support their positions with credible-seeming legal arguments, the value preferences of the judges never factor into the choices they make."); Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, "Tenured" Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1998) ("We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when most legal commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled from politics and that legal judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the decision maker."); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 REV. , 1152 REV. (1985 ("It is a commonplace that law is 'political.'"); Jerry Elmer, Legal Realism, Legal Formalism and the D'Oench Duhme Doctrine: A Perspective on R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. NFD, 53 R.I. B.J. 9, 11 (2004) ("Today, we are all Legal Realists. Being Realists, we understand two things: that judges do make law, not just find it, and that public policy considerations may properly enter into a judge's deliberations."); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870 -1960 , 169-212 (1992 (legal realism's most important legacy was its challenge to the notion that law has an autonomous role separate from politics); Michael C. 'Y 273, 286-87 (1987) ("The judicially-driven common law system develops substantive standards that are as much a product of collective wisdom as the statutory output of Congress, perhaps more. With the many real constraints a common law system places on judges, it is perhaps astounding that any evolution of law actually occurs, that creative judicial 'lawmaking' (beyond individual cases) exists at all. Maybe this is why the progress of the common law has sometimes seemed to be so painfully slow."); GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982) ("The incremental nature of common law adjudication regulatory law can occur quickly, and this is especially likely to occur when the same political party gains control of the legislative and executive branches.
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Shifting our focus from common law cases to statutory and regulatory cases, we again see that realism about judicial lawmaking does not imply that the content of legal rules is determined as much by judges' policy preferences as by the policy preferences of those leading the other two branches of government. Judicial deference to the enactments of the legislative and executive branches is the norm 44 , and judicial interpretation of these enactments generally occurs in the context of adjudicating a dispute that has already arisen between particular parties 45 so this fact-specific context tends to minimize the extent to which any individual judge's policy preferences meant that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of judges could only do so over time and in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people. 645, 656-60 & n.78 (1999) (1998 shift in Alabama Supreme Court's majority from Democrats receiving campaign contributions primarily from plaintiffs' trial lawyers to Republicans receiving campaign contributions primarily from businesses "marked a major turning point. Cases that plaintiffs had previously won fivevotes-to-four now turned into defendant victories by the same margin"); Id. at 684 ("[A]rbitration cases indicate that the court often splits along predictable, and highly partisan, lines. Justices whose campaigns are funded by plaintiffs' lawyers are all Democrats and oppose arbitration, while justices whose campaigns are funded by business are nearly all Republicans and favor arbitration. There is a strong correlation between a justice's source of campaign funds and how that justice votes in arbitration cases."); id. at 685 ("Arbitration law in Alabama seems to have no doctrinal integrity that survives the vicissitudes of the interest group battle. This law is indeed politics, in a very real and direct sense. This law provides evidence for the strong strain of Legal Realism which 'contends that law is politics through and through and that judges exercise broad discretionary authority.'").
44. In sum, the realist truism that "judges make law" is very different from a claim that all judicial decisions consist entirely of the judge's political views. A "balanced realism," to use Brian Tamanaha's appealing label, 47 recognizes both that judges' policy preferences have little or no influence on many judicial decisions and that judges' policy preferences have a significant influence on other judicial decisions. Empirical studies tend to support this balanced view. 48 As Tamanaha puts it, "[i]n a well-functioning legal system, 46. James B. Bean Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be. Of course this mode of action poses 'difficulties of a ... practical sort,' when courts decide to overrule prior precedent. But those difficulties are one of the understood checks upon judicial law-making; to eliminate them is to render courts substantially more free to 'make new law,' and thus to alter in a fundamental way the assigned balance of responsibility and power among the three branches.").
47 data] is that every case provokes competition between a justice's preferences on the one hand and the legal materials on the other. When the legal materials are very strong, they can produce unanimity despite conflicting preferences. But when the legal materials aren't so strong-when they don't point to a clear answer and leave room for discretionary judgment-the competition is won by the justice's underlying preferences and views of the world."); Gregory C. REV. 1133 REV. , 1143 REV. (2010 ("Even the most ardent supporters of strategic and legal models of decision making acknowledge that a portion of decisions are best explained by ideology."). Caution about empirical studies of judges' ideologies, attitudes and policy preferences is warranted because judges largely abide by and apply the law, there are practice-related, social and institutional factors that constrain judges and judges render generally predictable decisions consistent with the law."
49 However, it is equally true "that judges sometimes make choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that they sometimes are influenced by their political views and personal biases." 50 Tamanaha explains that, "the legal realists viewed judging in similarly balanced terms. They did not assert that judges routinely manipulated the law to produce desired outcomes."
51 As Judge Richard Posner notes, successful reconciliation of legal realism "with the undoubted fact that there is a fair degree of predictability" in the law occurred at least as long as ago as 1960.
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To reiterate, the realist truism that "judges make law" is very different from a claim that all judicial decisions consist entirely of the judge's political views. Perhaps most, or even all, judges usually succeed in subordinating their policy preferences to those of some other lawmaker, such as the legislature that enacted the relevant statute 53 or the higher court that decided the relevant case 'Y 623, 638 (2012) .
59. For this reason, "When discussing appointments to the Bench, we distinguish different kinds of desirable characteristics judges should possess. We value their knowledge of the law and their skills in interpreting laws and in arguing in ways showing their legal experience and expertise. We also value their wisdom and understanding of human nature, their moral professional/technical side may include applying to the facts of a case, law made by someone other than the judge (e.g., a legislature,) as well as running a courtroom and so forth. But judging also involves lawmaking, the political side highlighted by the Legal Realists. "Just as it is one-sided to denigrate the technical, lawyerly side of judging by claiming that judges are simply 'politicians in robes,' it is also one-sided to denigrate the lawmaking side of judging by claiming that the political views of a judge are irrelevant to his or her job as a judge."
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The political/lawmaking side of judging looms larger, the higher the court. In other words, the extent to which (inevitable) judicial lawmaking allows judges to inject their political views into law rises, the higher the court. Trial judges play less of a lawmaking role than appellate judges, especially supreme court justices, simply because court systems are hierarchical and trial courts are at the bottom. 61 The legal rulings of trial courts can be reversed, de novo, by appellate courts. 62 In contrast, appellate courts are often the final word, as a practical matter, on issues of law. Appellate courts' common law rulings can be overturned by statute, but enacting any legislation requires overcoming the inertia of a legislature with many issues competing for its attention. Similarly, overcoming that inertia is also needed to overturn judicial interpretations of statutes. This inertia point is even stronger with respect to judicial decisions interpreting constitutions.
These decisions can be overturned, not by statute, but by constitutional amendment. Unless and until that burdensome process is completed, United States Supreme Court justices are the final word on the United States Constitution, and state supreme court justices are the final word on their state constitutions. 63 In short, all appellate judges are, as one of them puts it, "occasional legislators" 64 and justices on our federal and state supreme courts are tremendously important and powerful lawmakers.
C. The Missouri Plan's Discomfort with Legal Realism
As just explained, all appellate judges are "occasional legislators" and justices on our federal and state supreme courts are tremendously important and powerful lawmakers. Accordingly, the democratic imperative to select lawmakers in a manner that respects the basic equality among citizens-the principle of one-person, one-vote-is especially strong with respect to the judges with the greatest lawmaking role, that is appellate judges, especially supreme court justices. Conversely, the Missouri Plan's discrimination against non-lawyers-its greater weighting of a lawyer's vote than another citizen's vote 65 -makes it an especially inappropriate way to select such judges. [The Missouri Plan] was popular in numerous states in the twentieth century, but in its application to courts of last resort it is linked to a vision of judicial office that is technocratic and apolitical. Although there was a time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when many American lawyers and some citizens deluded themselves with the belief that judges could be trained to be professional technicians interpreting statutes and constitutions without regard to their political consequences, there is virtually no one who thinks that today.
As applied to highest state courts making decisions laden with political consequences, merit selection [the Missouri Plan] is therefore an increasingly difficult idea to sell, especially in an era in which the Supreme Court of the United States has undertaken so visibly to exercise such enormous political power and discretion with inconsistent regard for legal texts. The citizenry is quick to see that political power would be transferred from themselves to those who do the merit selecting. Despite the considerable advantages of merit selection for selecting professional technicians who sit on lower courts, its time as a politically viable alternative to judicial elections has passed. Id. at 469-70 (internal citations omitted). See also Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 451, 451-52 (2008) ("Public involvement in the staffing of high courts is beneficial from a democratic perspective because of the greater discretion and policy-making authority exercised by high courts. Lower courts, by contrast, are more often bound by settled law, and the judges on such courts do not make policy to the extent that other courts do. As a result, there is less need for public involvement in the selection of The victims of this discrimination, however, may not be troubled by the inappropriateness of the Missouri Plan for selecting lawmakers because they may not realize that it is being used to select lawmakers. 67 While most people likely would object to a lawyer's vote counting more heavily than a nonlawyer's vote in the selection of governors and legislatures, that is because most people know that governors and legislators are lawmakers. In contrast, many non-lawyers may not know that judges are lawmakers. Many nonlawyers may believe the myth that judges apply law made by others but do not, or at least should not, make law themselves. These non-lawyers may, therefore, believe that judges should be selected entirely on their professional competence and ethics and that assessments of these factors are best left to lawyers.
Thus lawyers defending the power advantage the Missouri Plan gives them over other citizens benefit from minimizing public awareness of the fact that judges inevitably make law. Regrettably, lawyers defending the Missouri Plan sometimes make their defense with published statements describing the judicial role in a way that omits the lawmaking part of that role. The following pages provide examples of such statements from the state whose version of the Missouri Plan goes farther than any other state supreme court selection process in discriminating against non-lawyers.
III. OMISSIONS OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN KANSAS
Kansas gives the members of its bar more power than their fellow citizens in selecting the state's two appellate courts. 68 As in a handful of other states, 69 lower-court judges, and such involvement may well be a negative influence if it encourages those judges to depart from the application of settled law."); Ware, supra note 2, at 768 ("the political/lawmaking side of judging is especially important for state supreme court justices because they are the final word on their state constitutions and common law. Accordingly, the case for democracy in judicial selection is at its strongest (and the case for elitism at its weakest) when the judges in question are supreme court justices because justices' lawmaking powers far exceed those of the 'professional technicians who sit on lower courts.'"). 67. Of course, non-lawyers may not even realize that the Missouri Plan discriminates against them, let alone that it discriminates against them in the selection of lawmakers. The discrimination of the Missouri Plan is concealed by those who describe the nominating commission as a body of "lawyers and non-lawyers," while omitting explanation of who selects these lawyers and non-lawyers. This discrimination against non-lawyers-taken farther in Kansas than in any other state 71 -is often defended on the ground that appellate judging has no political/lawmaking dimension, but rather is a purely professional/technical activity. Therefore, (this faulty argument continues,) assessment of potential appellate judges ought to focus only on their professional competence and ethics, while disregarding their political views. In short, defenders of Kansas's current appellate court selection process often build their case on a foundation that crumbled about a century ago: the myth that judges do not make law.
For example, former Kansas Bar Association President, Linda Parks, describes the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission, not as a body that selects lawmakers, but rather as a body "that discusses lawyers and their qualifications for a job about which lawyers know the most."
72 Ms. Parks goes so far as to analogize the role of Kansas lawyers in selecting appellate judges to the role of medical doctors in referring patients to other, more specialized, [t] he best theorist of our actual existing democratic system").
The election of judges violates Schumpeter's conception of democratic rule. In that conception, the people vote only on the top officials, the ones who make the really consequential decisions, so that the people have some sense of whether those are the officials they want ruling them. The people are not busy monitoring the activities of the civil servants. That is not their function. They are not to waste their time trying to master issues and to figure out whether the dog catcher is catching enough dogs. . . . . . . . [T]he election of judges even at the state or local level is contrary to the core of Schumpeter's insight, which is that we do not want our citizens to spend their time trying to master technical issues of governance. That is not an efficient division of The power of this point against judicial selection processes that violate a democratic society's basic equality among citizens-the principle of oneperson, one-vote-may be lost on those who do not realize that judicial selection is lawmaker selection. So members of the Kansas bar defending their power advantage (over other Kansas citizens) in judicial selection benefit from minimizing public awareness of the fact that judges inevitably make law.
Ms. Parks is not the only lawyer defending the current Kansas appellate court selection process by publishing statements describing the appellate judge's role in a way that omits the lawmaking part of this role. Such statements have also been made by Kansas judges, sitting and retired. 77 For example, the late Richard Greene, then chief judge of the Kansas Court of Appeals, testified before the Kansas Legislature against a bill that would have reduced the extent to which the state discriminates against non-lawyers in judicial selection. 78 In opposition to that bill, Judge Greene also published a newspaper op-ed praising the current Kansas appellate court selection process, which he described as a process designed "to ensure that only the best and brightest were selected to the Court of Appeals." The high quality of the Kansas Court of Appeals, Judge Greene said, is due to the nominating commission's focus on prospective judges' "merit," rather than their politics. In fact, Judge Greene asserted that judges' politics are "of no relevance." 81 He said Kansans need "judges whose sole allegiance is to the applicable law of our state, as well as labor. Most of what courts do is opaque to people who are not lawyers. It is completely unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know enough about judicial performance to be able to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently.
Id.
77 Greene, at ¶ 11) ("Judges should be chosen based on the criteria set forth in K.S.A. 20-3004 to bring intelligent, experienced, well-reasoned, and impartial justice to every case before them. Their politics-their allegiance to a Governor or to the Senate-are not only of no relevance, but should never take the front seat to merit based qualifications."). The false dichotomy between "politics" and "merit" in judicial selection is discussed infra Section IV. http://www.kansas.com/2011/02/24/1733731/dont-politicize-judicialappointment.html#ixzz1ZCLAP7wA. our state and federal constitutions." 82 Yes, of course judges' allegiance should be to the law, including our state and federal constitutions. But that allegiance does not ineluctably guide the judge to make a particular choice among various reasonable interpretations of a vague or ambiguous constitutional or statutory provision. Reasonable people of good faith, including judges, can disagree about the best interpretation of such provisions and therefore the best result of the particular case. Claims to the contrary do not acknowledge the reality that the first section of this article showed has been "deeply rooted" for generations now-that judicial interpretation of constitutional and statutory ambiguities necessarily involves judgments of policy by the court. 83 And what of the common law, which went unmentioned in Judge Greene's anti-realist argument that judges' politics are "of no relevance"?
84
He said "[w]e need . . . judges who will fairly and impartially interpret and apply Kansas law without regard to political ideology."
85 But this description of the judicial role does not account for the fact that judges make the common law, not just "interpret and apply" it. In sum, it is unfortunate that the chief judge of one of Kansas's two appellate courts publicly described the role of an appellate judge in a way that omitted the lawmaking part of that role.
Other defenders of the current Kansas appellate court selection system similarly ignore about a century of legal realism to assert the irrelevance of judges' political views 86 and the absence of judicial lawmaking. rule of law to their cases. Application of the rule of law requires knowledge of the law; this requires the willingness and ability to research caselaw and statutes, which reveal what the law is. These abilities are essential for every level of the legal system from the lawyers to the judges. Lawyers therefore are in a better position than any other group of people to determine which applicants possess the proper combination of professional knowledge, skill, integrity, and work ethic to carry out the duties of a judge.
Judges from municipal courts right up through the Supreme Court must follow the rule of law in deciding cases.
89
In what sense "must" the Supreme Court do anything in deciding cases? As noted above, unless and until the burdensome process of constitutional amendment is completed, U.S. Supreme Court justices are the final word on the U.S. Constitution and state supreme court justices are the final word on their state constitutions. 90 And, of course, this includes the power to hold unconstitutional laws enacted by the other two branches of government. These basic realities are notably absent from Judge Russell's description of the judicial role. Also absent are the more mundane realities of judges inevitably making law in their choices among various reasonable interpretations of vague or ambiguous statutory provisions and their choices among various possible common law rules.
91
Examples of these mundane realities follow. These examples get beyond headline-grabbing cases and the oft-studied Supreme Court of the United States to identify and analyze the judicial lawmaking embedded in the routine work of state's court system, the sort of judicial work that weaves most of the threads in the fabric of law. 
IV. EXAMPLES OF JUDICIAL LAWMAKING IN KANSAS

A. Kansas Supreme Court
99
Contrary to Judge Russell's anti-realist statement quoted above, Justice Beier acknowledges that nothing tells "courts of last resort" 100 what they "must" 101 do in deciding cases. Rather than being compelled to "follow the rule of law," as Judge Russell claims, Justice Beier rightly says the Kansas Supreme Court may change the state's common law if the judges on this court believe some aspect of that law "is no longer sound."
102
Those sitting on the Kansas Supreme Court, like judges sitting on other states' high courts, make common law based on what they are "persuaded" is "appropriate for the time."
103
Those are the words of a unanimous opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court and they are not earth-shattering. They are merely describing something virtually every lawyer has seen since the first year of law school. State supreme courts make common law based on what they are persuaded is appropriate for the time. Changing the law is what state supreme courts do with common law rules they believe to be "decrepit and unpopular." They overturn the decrepit and unpopular old law and make new law, which they believe will be more in keeping with contemporary society. This lawmaking by state supreme courts is not always done as openly as it was by the Kansas Supreme Court in Coleman, but it is done from time to time. It is part of the job. We have known this at least since the legal realists of the early 20th Century. 
Product Liability
The Coleman opinion may be one of the clearest examples of Kansas judges making common law because of the duality of the court's choice: whether to keep or reject an existing rule. In contrast, legal rules are not always so "black or white," but often more like "shades of gray." That is, courts sometimes make law, not by changing a legal rule to its polar opposite in a single case, but rather by changing it gradually over several cases, spread over many years.
104 Product liability law is an example of this incremental judicial lawmaking in Kansas, as it is in other states.
Must a product liability plaintiff prove the defendant's negligence in order to recover? No, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Brooks v. Dietz, 105 which brought strict products liability into Kansas law. The Brooks court deemed "correct" the assertion that it had "never explicitly adopted the doctrine of strict liability," 106 but pointed out that it had "for years recognized something closely akin to strict liability in the food and body preparation cases."
107
Continuing this history, the Brooks court said: "In recent years we have gone beyond the 'food and body preparation' cases and have held manufacturers and sellers strictly liable for other dangerously defective products." 108 Brooks then endorsed what it rightly called the "seminal" case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 109 This California case, according to the Kansas Supreme Court, "recognized that liability for damages resulting from putting in commerce a dangerously defective product is not the result of contract but, like other tort liability, is imposed by public policy."
110
Yes, "public policy," indeed. Public policy as determined by a California court, which, along with other factors, persuaded courts elsewhere in the country, including the Kansas Supreme Court, to change their states' laws to adopt this policy as well. In Brooks, the Kansas Supreme Court recounts the history of Kansas product liability law changing, incrementally, through a series of judicial decisions. It is a very typical story of how judges make the common law. And it is a story, told by the highest judges in Kansas, of how their court made an important part of the common law of Kansas.
Adopting strict liability was not the end of the Kansas Supreme Court's lawmaking role in product cases. I will not mention all the twists and turns but note only two. First, in a case alleging defective design of a product, can a 104. See Widiss, supra note 42 ("notwithstanding respect for precedent, common law courts reconsider prior precedents in response to changing needs or evolving norms; often, this occurs gradually as prior decisions are distinguished and new decisions slowly accumulate until ultimately a high court announces a new rule").
105. 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976 Deere and Co., 112 which acknowledged that "the open and obvious rule barring recovery in a design defect case" was "still recognized in a few jurisdictions."
113 In other words, Siruta's rejection of the "open and obvious" rule barring recovery was a lawmaking choice by the Kansas Supreme Court. It had the option to retain that legal rule-as some other states' courts had done-but it chose to reject that rule.
The Delaney court continued the Kansas Supreme Court's role in making product liability law as Delaney held that in a design-defect case the plaintiff is not required to show evidence of a reasonable alternative design. The court chose this rule, while acknowledging that a few states chose the opposite rule. 114 In choosing how to make Kansas law on this subject, the court relied in part on a law review article in which the author "states that the reasonable alternative design requirement is not supported by public policy or economic analysis."
115
In short, Delaney is yet another example of judges making law based on what they think is good policy. Delaney and these other product liability cases are examples of high court judges making law based on what they are persuaded is, as Justice Beier put it, "appropriate for the time."
116 Although these product cases may have been more gradual than Coleman, (the workers compensation case), they are similarly solid examples of the Kansas Supreme Court making law, not just applying or interpreting it. Thus they stand in refutation of descriptions (quoted in section II) of a judge's role that omit the lawmaking part of that role.
A few more brief examples of lawmaking by the Kansas Supreme Court follow.
3. Parolees Does the state have a legal duty to control the conduct of parolees to prevent harm to other persons or property? When the Kansas Supreme Court confronted this question in Schmidt v. HTG, Inc., it noted a split of authority in other states. 117 For example, a Washington court held that, yes, "a parole officer takes charge of the parolees he or she supervises despite the lack of a custodial or continuous relationship" and this had the effect of imposing 111. 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983 liability on the state. 118 However, the Kansas Supreme Court "reject[ed]" this rule and said "The better-reasoned and more logical approach is that taken in [a Virginia case] which held that state parole officers did not take charge" 119 of a parolee in the relevant sense.
So Kansas law on this topic (as in the workers compensation and product liability examples above) was made, not by the legislative or executive branches, but by the judges on the Kansas Supreme Court. In Schmidt, as in the workers compensation and product liability cases above, the lawmaking judges did not pretend that they were compelled by the legislature or anyone else to choose one possible legal rule over another possible legal rule. Instead, the judges decided which view was "better-reasoned" and then made that view the law.
Malpractice Actions Against Criminal-Defense Attorneys
May a convicted criminal defendant pursue a legal malpractice action against his criminal-defense attorney without first obtaining any postconviction relief? No, he may not, the Kansas Supreme Court held in Canaan v. Bartee, 120 adopting what is known as the "exoneration rule."
121
In so holding, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that it was making law. The Canaan court said that "Whether a plaintiff must be exonerated in postconviction proceedings before bringing a legal malpractice action against his criminal defense attorney is an issue of first impression in Kansas."
122 The court discussed earlier Kansas cases and concluded that they did not resolve the issue: "Thus, we are left to decide whether we will apply the exoneration rule in legal malpractice actions in Kansas."
123
The Canaan court reviewed decisions from courts around the country and noted that most adopted the exoneration rule but some did not. The court also summarized what it candidly called "Policy Reasons Behind the Exoneration Rule." 124 The Canaan court's punch line was: "After consideration of these authorities, the varying policy justifications, and the shortcomings of the various approaches, we find the majority view persuasive. We hold that before Canaan may sue his attorneys for legal malpractice he must obtain postconviction relief." quoted in section II of this article, Judge Malone did not make the anti-realist claims that judges just "interpret and apply" 131 law made by others or that judges research to "reveal what the law is" and then simply "must follow the rule of law in deciding cases."
132 Judge Malone acknowledged that the Kansas Supreme Court makes the law on negligence per se. The Kansas Supreme Court does not merely "follow" the law or "interpret" the law or "apply" the law; it "makes" the law.
In The Kansas Supreme Court held that the parties' contract did not require that disputes be resolved by Washington courts. In reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted the Kansas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) as providing that a contract was formed when Wachter's agent signed DCI's proposal, 137 so the later delivery of the shrinkwrap agreement made the shrinkwrap agreement an offer to modify an existing contract. That offer was never accepted by Wachter, the Kansas Supreme Court said, so the original contract (with no terms on where disputes would be resolved) continued to state the parties' rights and duties.
138
In contrast, a dissenting opinion by Justice Luckert argued that the parties' contract required that disputes be resolved by Washington courts because the UCC should be interpreted as providing that Wachter's acceptance of DCI's proposal included acceptance of the license. Justice Luckert wrote:
I disagree with the majority's analysis that the license agreement was a modification of the contract. Rather, the original offer included the license or, at least, expressed the intent of the parties that a license was a part of the offer. Wachter assented to and accepted these terms by its conduct. DCI's letter transmitting the proposal notified Wachter that "[t]he proposal includes modules and licenses." Wachter did not question, object to, or offer an alternative to the proposal. Instead Wachter signed the proposal, thus accepting the offer which included licenses.
139
Importantly, Justice Luckert's dissent cited and analyzed two sections of the Kansas UCC, § 2-204 and § 2-209, 140 and these two sections were also among those cited and analyzed by the majority opinion. 141 In short, both majority and dissent were interpreting the same statutory language, but they came to different conclusions about the law. This is not shocking. As the first section of this article explained, the language of statutory and constitutional provisions is sometimes vague or 137. Id. at 751. DCI's proposal requested Wachter to accept its offer to sell Wachter software by signing the proposal above the words "[p]lease ship the software listed above." Accordingly, Wachter accepted DCI's offer to sell the software to it by signing the proposal at Wachter's office in Lenexa. Thus, a contract was formed when Wachter accepted DCI's offer to sell it the software, indicating agreement between the parties.
Id.
138. "Proposed amendments that materially alter the original agreement are not considered part of the contract unless both parties agree to the amendments. UCC 2-209 requires express assent to the proposed modifications." Id. at 752 (citations omitted). "DCI argues that Wachter expressly consented to the shrink wrap agreement when it installed and used the software rather than returning it. However, continuing with the contract after receiving a writing with additional or different terms is not sufficient to establish express consent to the additional or different terms." Id.
139. Id. at 755 (Luckert, J., dissenting This case, Wachter, was a genuinely hard case. Confirming this, both the majority and dissent were able to cite cases from other jurisdictions interpreting the same statutory language in other states' versions of the UCC.
143 Just as this statutory interpretation split the Kansas Supreme Court, it similarly split judges elsewhere in the country. In some parts of the country the law is that a shrinkwrap license is part of the original contract and thus enforceable, while in other parts of the country the law is that a shrinkwrap license is not part of the original contract so it is only enforceable if the parties modify their original contract to include the license. 144 The same statutory language around the country results in different law because different judges have made different law while interpreting the same statutory language. This is no more surprising than the aforementioned examples of judges making the common law. Judges making law in interpreting statutes is also inevitable and routine. It is simply part of what judges do.
Interestingly, three members of the Kansas Supreme Court dissented from Wachter. Justices Nuss and Beier joined Justice Luckert's dissenting opinion. So it was a 4-3 decision. Had one more member of the court been persuaded by the dissent's interpretation of the UCC then that interpretation would have become Kansas law. This shows the lawmaking power of each individual appellate judge. Just as a single state legislator's vote can mean the difference between a state's law including one rule or another, so a single judge's vote can mean the difference between a state's law including one rule or another. 145 142. Sunstein, supra note 28, at 2591. 143. The majority cited Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991 ) (refusing to uphold a shrink wrap license agreement as an amendment to the parties' contract); Arizona Retail Systems v. Software Link, 831 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D. Ariz. 1993) (concluding that a software company could not unilaterally change the terms of a preexisting contract by including a shrink wrap license agreement with the software when it shipped); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 , 1341 -42 (D. Kan. 2000 (denying the application of an arbitration clause contained in a form with standard terms packaged inside a computer box); United States Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201 , 1206 (D. Kan. 1998 ) (rejecting "single use only" language on the packaging because there was no evidence that the parties agreed on this limitation in the contract), while the dissent cited Hill v. Gateway 2000 , Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 , 1149 , cert. denied 522 U. S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47, 139 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1452-53; Brower v. Gateway 2000 , 246 A.D.2d 246, 250-51, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998 and Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software, 140 Wash.2d 568, 583-84, 998 P.2d 305 (2000) .
144. Id. 145. See State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004) .
B. Kansas Court of Appeals
The cases just discussed show that the Kansas Supreme Court, like any other state's high court, inevitably makes law. One might concede that supreme court justices make law but nevertheless contend that intermediate appellate court judges merely "interpret and apply" the law, rather than make the law. 146 In fact, however, Kansas Court of Appeals judges are lawmakers, too. This was acknowledged by soon-to-be-Justice Lawton Nuss in 2002.
147
As Nuss said, when the Court of Appeals was created some believed that the new court primarily would make a "simple review of trial records" and correct the trial errors, e.g., evidentiary rulings. . 21-4624(e) . Now, without any intervening change in substantive law, the majority opinion overrules Kleypas, not because the statute as construed is unconstitutional, but because the majority decides the Kleypas court exceeded its judicial authority in construing the statute. Kleypas was a 4 to 3 decision, consisting of a majority opinion and two written dissents. None of the three opinions took the position that the Kansas death penalty law must be struck down as constitutionally impermissible. The majority opinion upheld the law with an extremely minor judicial construction relative to equipoise, with the three dissenters upholding the law as written. In the case before us, another 4 to 3 decision, the majority concludes the death penalty is fatally flawed and rejects the majority's action in Kleypas which remedied the perceived equipoise flaw. There has been no change in relevant constitutional law as expressed by the United States Supreme Court. The only change has been the composition of the Kansas Supreme Court occasioned by the retirements of Justices Larson, Six, Lockett, and Abbott. While fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis is not an "inexorable command," we should be highly skeptical of reversing an earlier decision where nothing has changed except the composition of the court. 150 "Our Supreme Court, however, has not determined 'whether the heightened standard of pleading fraud with particularity applies when constructive fraud is being pled' in Kansas."
151 Here, the judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledge that the judges on the Kansas Supreme Court make law. The appeals judges in Hemphill did not say that the Kansas Legislature has not made the law on the pleading standard for constructive fraud. The appeals court judges evidently do not expect the legislature to make such law. The appeals court judges do expect the Kansas Supreme Court to make such law.
However, the Kansas Supreme Court has not yet made such law, so what did the appeals court judges do? They made the law on the pleading standard for constructive fraud. They held that the heightened standard applies: "we are persuaded by the reasoning in the numerous court decisions [mostly outside Kansas] that have held that the specificity in pleading requirement applies to a constructive fraud claim."
152 Did the Court of Appeals have the power to rule the other way and thus make Kansas law different? Yes, the judges on the Court of Appeals did not claim they were compelled to apply the heightened standard; they said they were "persuaded" to apply the heightened standard. They had lawmaking power and acknowledged it.
Economic Loss
In Louisburg Bldg. & Development Co., L.L.C. v. Albright, 153 plaintiffs asserted both a breach of contract claim and a fraud-in-the-inducement claim. The district court granted defendant a judgment on the fraud-in-theinducement claim because of the economic-loss doctrine. 154 The economic-loss doctrine originated in products-liability law, preventing purchasers from suing in tort where the damages claimed were purely economic-stemming from product-repair costs, product-replacement costs, inadequate product value, or lost profits resulting from product defects. To recover in tort, the product purchaser with merely disappointed economic expectations had to demonstrate some "harm above and court ruling correct or in error? In answering this question, the Court of Appeals cited Kansas cases 155 but did not suggest that these precedents were right on point. That is, the appeals court judges did not suggest that these precedents compelled them to rule one way or the other. Instead, the appeals court judges pointed out that:
In the context of claims for fraud in the inducement, the economicloss doctrine has produced exceptional inconsistency. On one hand, a majority of states have held that the economic-loss doctrine never applies to fraud-in-the-inducement claims. . . . On the other hand, a minority of states have applied the economic-loss doctrine to fraudin-the-inducement claims that merely attempt to recover damages resulting from unfulfilled contractual promises.
156
The Court of Appeals then adopted the minority approach because "The minority's approach is logical." 157 As it may well be. But a majority of states adopted the contrary approach so many courts must see logic in that approach, as well. In short, reasonable people can disagree about whether it is good policy for the economic loss doctrine to apply to any fraud-in-the-inducement claims. Who got to convert their views on this policy question into Kansas law? The judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals. In doing so, they made Kansas law on the economic loss doctrine. Techs Intern, Inc. v. State, 158 which involved a particular sort of settlement agreement. The agreement purportedly assigned, from one settling party to another settling party, claims against a non-settling party. The Court of Appeals said, "The legality of this kind of agreement has been, heretofore, beyond a broken contractual promise." The doctrine initially aimed to prevent contract law from dissolving into tort law by drawing a distinction between commercial transactions, where contract law protects economic expectations, and consumer transactions, where tort law remedies physical injuries to individual consumers. The doctrine has since expanded to serve as the dividing line between contract and the broader array of tort claims, including claims for negligence and strict liability. Three policies seem to be driving the expansion of the doctrine: (1) protecting parties' expectations with respect to their bargained-for limited liability; (2) encouraging the buyer to insure against the risk of economic loss; and (3) preventing "unnecessary complexity" resulting from the assertion of tort claims that merely duplicate breach-ofcontract claims. This court has recognized similar policies in its own applications of the economic-loss doctrine. This court has also held that these policies remain applicable when the purchaser is an individual consumer, as opposed to a sophisticated commercial purchaser. Id. at 621-22 (citations omitted).
Settlement Agreements Similar lawmaking by the Kansas Court of Appeals is evident in Roof-
155. See, e.g., id. at 623 ("The Kansas Supreme Court has previously recognized the importance of this policy, warning against the 'danger' of allowing claims that attempt to turn every breach of contract into a tort. See Gerhardt v. Harris, 261 Kan. 1007 Kan. , 1021 Kan. , 934 P.2d 976 (1997 In Roof-Techs, the Court of Appeals did not suggest that its hands were tied by a statute or by prior rulings of the Kansas Supreme Court. To its credit, the Court of Appeals' opinion frankly recognized that it was in uncharted territory. So the appellate judges did what appellate judges do when in uncharted territory, they stepped up to their role as "occasional lawmakers" 161 and made the law on these sorts of settlement agreements.
Medical Devices
All the above examples of lawmaking by the Kansas Court of Appeals might be characterized as common law, rather than statutory law. But the Kansas Court of Appeals makes law in its interpretation of statutes as well. An example is § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 165 is a mixture of judges making common law and judges making law by interpreting statutes. Berry, a nurse licensed by the Kansas State Board of Nursing, admitted to the Board that she had a problem with alcohol dependency and agreed to submit to random testing to confirm that she was abstaining from alcohol. 166 The Board contracted with defendant Compass Vision, Inc., to administrator this program, and Compass engaged defendant, NMS, to provide alcohol testing for nurses and to report its test results to the Board. The Kansas Court of Appeals majority reversed, holding that defendants did owe a legal duty to Berry. 171 In so holding, the judges made law. The Court of Appeals majority acknowledged this in noting that "[w]hether a legal duty exists is an issue of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review."
172
While the majority resolved this issue of law in Berry's favor, Judge Buser's dissenting opinion would have resolved it in favor of the defendants.
173
In short, different judges on the Court of Appeals favored different legal rules. The majority of the three judges deciding the case got to make the law simply because they outnumbered the dissenting judge. Just as a single state legislator's vote can mean the difference between Kansas law including one rule or another, so a single Court of Appeals judge's vote can mean the difference between Kansas law including one rule or another.
While negligence law, including the duty element of a negligence claim, is generally common law, Kansas case law on whether to impose a duty considers, among other factors, whether there is a "public policy against imposing the claimed duty on the defendant."
174 Judge Buser's dissenting opinion concluded that there was and reached that conclusion by interpreting certain Kansas statutes.
175 By contrast, the majority interpreted the statutes differently and thus concluded that those statutes did not indicate a public policy against imposing the duty. 176 The point, of course, is not to assess 170. Id. 171. Id. at 750. 172 . Id. at 749. 173. Judge Buser "Would hold that laboratory testing facilities and third-party administrators do not owe a duty to nurses addicted to alcohol whose specimens they test under a contract with the administrative agency empowered by the legislature to regulate the professional competency of nurses." Id. at 753.
174. Id. at 749. 175. "It is the public policy of this state, as decided by the Kansas Legislature in its enactment of K.S.A. 65-1120, that the Kansas State Board of Nursing (Board) has authority to establish, regulate, and enforce the professional competency of nurses. Moreover, pursuant to K.S.A. 77-621(c), the legislature has granted the judiciary a limited power to review (using a deferential standard) the Board's disciplinary actions against impaired nurses. These legislatively established public policies are undermined by the majority's decision of first impression in Kansas." Id. at 752-53.
176. Finally, there is no public policy against imposing liability. We defer to our legislature in establishing public policy and find no expression by our legislature that urinalysis providers are exempt from liability for their negligence in providing faulty results or interpretations. These defendants, as testing providers to the Board, do not argue that they are protected by sovereign immunity. We find no public policy that would immunize these defendants from the consequences of their actions. Therefore, the third element for establishing a duty has been satisfied.
In this regard we note the dissent's public policy argument which is predicated upon the fact that this claim arose in the context of administrative proceedings to determine Berry's fitness to practice her profession. The dissent seems to confuse the wrongful whether the majority or dissent better interpreted the statutes. The point is to note another example in which judges make law in the course of interpreting statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
What do these examples from Kansas's two appellate courts show? Only judges making law. No surprise, of course. We have known, at least since the Legal Realists of the early 20th Century, that judges make law. And it is similarly well established that, although judging has a professional/technical side, as well as a political/lawmaking side, the latter's importance rises, the higher the court. All appellate judges are "occasional legislators" 177 and supreme court justices are tremendously important and powerful lawmakers. So no one within the mainstream of our country's 20th and 21st Century legal thought will be surprised by this article's demonstration of repeated lawmaking by the judges on the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas Court of Appeals.
178
The decisions summarized in this article show Kansas's two appellate courts making law in the course of deciding cases. Whether the law made in any of these cases is good or bad policy is, of course, beside the point. The point is that the policy views of appellate judges matter because appellate judges are lawmakers-so the Kansas judges and lawyers who omit lawmaking from their description of the appellate judge's role omit something conduct Berry complains of with the product of that wrongful conduct. The wrongful conduct in this action is the claimed negligence of Compass and NMS, not the action of the Board in revoking Berry's nursing license. The consequence of this claimed negligence was the loss of Berry's license and the damages that followed.
We conclude that under Kansas law Berry has alleged the breach of a recognizable duty, and she has pled a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Id. at 750.
177. POSNER, supra note 9, at 81. 178. As then-State Senator, now-Attorney General of Kansas, Derek Schmidt, said:
[T]he law is not always black-and-white -particularly when it presents itself in the form of the difficult issues that confront the Supreme Court [of Kansas]. If the difficult questions of law could always -or even usually -be settled with a clearly correct answer merely by reading and applying the constitutions, statutes and cases, then there would be no need to have seven justices on the Supreme Court. One would suffice -so long as that one was sufficiently learned in the law. But, of course, that is not the nature of the law -as evidenced, inter alia, by the many split decisions of our Supreme Court. Being properly experienced and credentialed in the law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for being an excellent justice. Judgment also is required as is a sensitivity to societal norms, trends, conditions and expectations. To put the point another way, justices require a certain amount of political savvy.
Judicial philosophy matters. Of course it does. To pretend otherwise is to believe the law is a math or science rather than an art or social studies. significant. A published statement describing the appellate judge's role as though it does not include lawmaking encourages non-lawyers to believe the myth that judges apply law made by others but do not inevitably make law themselves.
Those non-lawyers who (wrongly) believe that judges are not lawmakers cannot be troubled by the fact that the Missouri Plan-even Kansas's uniquely extreme version of it 179 -is an aberrant violation of our society's practice of selecting lawmakers democratically. Non-lawyers who believe in the principle that lawmakers should be selected democratically need to know that judicial selection is lawmaker selection to be troubled by the Missouri Plan's violation of this principle. Non-lawyers who do not know that judges inevitably make law may believe that the role of a judge consists only of its professional/technical side and, therefore, believe that judges should be selected entirely on their professional competence and ethics and that assessments of these factors are best left to lawyers. In short, a lawyer who omits lawmaking from a published statement about the judicial role is furthering a misimpression that helps empower lawyers at the expense of nonlawyers, in violation of basic democratic equality, the principle of one-person, one-vote.
Lawyers (in Kansas or elsewhere) who seek to defend the power advantage the Missouri Plan gives them over other citizens can honestly acknowledge that this is a power advantage in the selection of lawmakers and then explain why they believe a departure from the principle of one-person, one-vote is justified in the selection of these particular lawmakers. But no honest Kansas lawyer who has been exposed to the cases discussed in this article can defend the state's current method of appellate court selection with a description of the judicial role that omits lawmaking. Honesty requires those who believe the Kansas bar should select any member of a judicial nominating commission to acknowledge that they are advocating discrimination against non-lawyers in the selection of lawmakers. The same point undoubtedly applies as well in the other 49 states. Debate over judicial selection in the United States can be honest if it forthrightly acknowledges that judicial selection is lawmaker selection.
